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Abstract—Growth of civil air traffic worldwide poses a great
challenge for the supporting Communication, Navigation and
Surveillance (CNS) infrastructure. Analogue systems have to be
replaced by digital means to optimize spectrum efficiency and au-
tomation is becoming much more important to be able to handle
the amount of participants in the air traffic system. As safety
and security are strongly intertwined in aviation, cybersecurity
is one key enabler for digitalization in civil aviation. As such we
investigate mutual authentication and key agreement methods
for the digital aeronautical ground-based communications system
L-band Digital Aeronautical Communication System (LDACS).
Thereby, we compare the suitability of three different Diffie-
Hellmann (DH) key exchange flavors used in a modified version
of the Station-To-Station (STS) protocol, for digital aeronautical
communication in terms of latency and security data overhead.
We conclude, the STS protocol based on a central Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) trust solution with Supersingular Isogeny
Diffie–Hellman (SIDH) for post-quantum security to be best
suited for long term security. However, due to the smaller
key sizes, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) is the more
resource efficient candidate and may play a role in low resource
authentication scenarios for LDACS.
Index Terms—Cybersecurity, LDACS, Authenticated Key Ex-
change, STS protocol
I. INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 crisis has vastly impacted worldwide civil
air traffic, reducing world passenger numbers by 35% to
65% compared to the pre-COVID-19 level [1]. Despite the
decline of passenger numbers, the entire industry is currently
undergoing a digital transformation, especially now to become
more efficient and cost-saving in the long term. One area
mostly affected by this trend is the Communication, Navi-
gation and Surveillance (CNS) infrastructure. With the Single
European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) program in the EU and
NextGEN in the US, several new digital aeronautical commu-
nication technologies shall be developed in the framework of
the Future Communications Infrastructure. Candidates in this
framework are Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communication
System (AeroMACS) for airport communications, SatCOM,
for oceanic, polar and remote domains, and L-band Digital
Aeronautical Communication System (LDACS) for long-range
terrestrial aeronautical communications [2].
As safety and security are strongly interrelated in aviation,
strong cybersecurity is the foundation and enabler for digital-
ization in aviation that is agreed on by the World Economic
Forum, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
and the cybersecurity research community [3]. Unfortunately
cybersecurity for CNS is still not realized in most deployed
systems as depicted in [4] and [5]. Thus future CNS systems
like LDACS require profound cybersecurity measures allowing
automated data processing and protection of the system against
threats from the IT sector.
In previous works we proposed cybersecurity functions and
measures for LDACS, such as Mutual Authentication and
Key Exchange (MAKE) protocols, authenticated encryption
for messages in transit and different trust solutions [6], [7].
However, there has been no discussion yet about the optimal
key agreement variation of the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
(DHKE) for digital aeronautical communications.
The objective of this paper is to compare three variations of
the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE) for the Station-To-
Station (STS) protocol in terms of induced latency and security
data overhead and decide their suitability for LDACS. The
investigated variations are (i) ephemeral DHKE, (ii) Elliptic
Curve DHKE (ECDH), and (iii) Supersingular Isogeny DHKE
(SIDH).
The rest of the paper is structures as follow: Section II
presents LDACS and its cybersecurity measures, as well as
relevant math and key sizes of the different DHKE flavors.
In Section III, we discuss a methodology to calculate latency
times for data exchange of LDACS and introduce the STS
protocol in depth, including message formats and sizes. With
the formulas from Section III and based on the message
formats, we calculate authentication latency and data overhead
and list our results in Section IV. Section V summarizes the
received results and concludes the paper. All used acronyms
are listed in the Appendix.
II. BACKGROUND
LDACS is a ground-based digital communications system
for flight guidance and communications related to the safety
and regularity of flight; developed in Europe and is currently
under standardization by ICAO [8]. It covers current Air
Traffic Services (ATS) and Aeronautical Operational Control
(AOC) data including future applications. Further, LDACS
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Fig. 1. Ephemeral DHKE protocol
enables new concepts, like sectorless Air Traffic Management
(ATM), and has at least 50 times more network capacity than
the currently used terrestrial links like the VHF Data Link
(VDL) Mode 2 system [8]. Instead of some kBit/s, LDACS
offers up to 2 MBit/s. By enabling not only communica-
tion but also navigation and surveillance at the same time,
it is the world’s first integrated CNS system [2]. A basic
LDACS network is formed by up to 512 Aircraft Station
(AS), which are served by a Ground Station (GS) and multiple
GS are connected to a Ground Station Controller (GSC). In
Section III we give a more detailed description about how
data is handled by LDACS. Cybersecurity considerations for
LDACS were first published in [9] and list five main objec-
tives:
1) A guarantee of safe and effective LDACS system oper-
ations together with system security functions,
2) supporting reliability and robustness,
3) supporting message authentication and integrity,
4) supporting confidentiality, and
5) supporting mutual entity authentication.
From these high level objectives, we derived security functions
and assigned algorithms, protocols and procedures to them.
First, we have to rely on an overall structure that enables us
to establish trust among communication entities. Therefore,
a certificate-based Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) solution,
necessary for the STS protocol, is conceivable. Ensuring that
all involved entities in the envisioned communication have a
valid identity and established a common secret, mutual entity
authentication and key negotiation are required. This can be
achieved by the STS [6] protocol together with different possi-
ble variations of the DHKE. In order to provide confidentiality,
integrity, and authenticity protection of messages in transit
AES-256 Galois Counter Mode (GCM) is applied [7].
Section II-A presents now background information to the
DHKE variants investigated, which are promising candidates
for our envisioned solution presented in Section III. This is
followed by a brief introduction to the assumed authenticated
key exchange protocol in Section II-B.
A. Overview of Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Variants
As central element, STS requires a DHKE, we want to
present three possible variants and compare them in terms of
amount of bits exchanged between communication partners,
denoted here as Alice and Bob.
(i) Ephemeral DHKE:
The original Diffie-Hellman or Diffie-Hellman-Merkle Key
Exchange was first published in 1976 [10] and is based on the
discrete logarithm or Diffie-Hellman problem: given a cyclic
group G of prime order n, a generator g of G and elements
gx, gy ∈ G, find gxy . Man-in-the-Middle attacks are still
possible when no authentication or additional security features
are used [11]. However, using the authenticated DHKE or STS
protocol with certificates and supported by a PKI [12] is still
a secure key exchange protocol today [13]. Public parameters
for the DHKE are (p, q, g): a large prime p, a prime divisor of
p−1: q, and an element g of order q in Zp× and generator for
cyclic multiplicative group G. The secret keys for Alice and
Bob are x, y ∈ Zp× and public keys are gx, gy ∈ Zp×. The
protocol run is depicted in Figure 1. If the STS protocol is
used, the sizes of the DHKE parameters still need to be large
enough. The Federal Office for Information Security Germany
suggests a key length of at least 3000 Bit for the use beyond
2022 [14]. As LDACS is foreseen to be realized after 2022,
we use sizes of 3072 Bit in this paper.
(ii) Elliptic Curve DHKE (ECDH):
As ephemeral DHKE requires large key spaces, other abelian
groups were researched, where the same idea could be applied.
One very successful cryptographic platform was the use of
elliptic curves over finite fields [15], [16], resulting in the
ECDH key agreement protocol. The public key sizes and thus
the group sizes could be reduced from 1024 Bit to 160 Bit,
from 3072 Bit to 256 Bit and from 15,360 Bit to 512 Bit
[17] respectively by using the discrete logarithm problem on
elliptic curves over finite fields. Please note that the protocol
run remains the same as depicted in Figure 1, only the symbols
have a different meaning: p is again a prime defining the field
Fp, a, b ∈ Fp define an elliptic curve, the cyclic subgroup is
defined by a generator g is now defined by the base point P
on E(Fp) and q := ord(P ) is the order of the base point
P in E(Fp). The secret parameters for Alice and Bob are
again x ∈ 1, ..., q − 1 and y ∈ 1, ..., q − 1 respectively and the
public keys gx, gy are now QA := x · P and QB := y · P
[16]. In terms of parameter sizes [14], the Federal Office
for Information Security Germany recommends the use of
RFC 5639 [18] and a minimum size of 256 Bit for x, y,QA
and QB . As we chose 3072 Bit for the ephemeral DHKE,
we choose now its equivalent in security on an elliptic curve,
which is 256 Bit sizes in this paper [17].
(iii) Supersingular Isogeny DHKE (SIDH):
To harden cryptographic protocols for quantum resistance the
idea of quantum-resistant public-key cryptosystems based on
the conjectured difficulty of finding isogenies between super-
singular elliptic curves was formulated in [19] and extended
for key exchange applications [20]. The basic idea is to
compose two random walks on an isogeny graph of elliptic
curves so that the end node of both ways is the same. As the
graph used for SIDH is chaotic, auxiliary points are required to
help Alice and Bob walking the respective other’s public key
[21]. For mathematical details in depth it is referred to [22]
Important to know is that the basic protocol run with Alice and
Bob choosing a secret key, calculating and exchanging a public
key remains the same as depicted in Figure 1. It can be used to
derive a shared secret. To demonstrate the effectiveness and
popularity of SIDH, we want to mention the Supersingular
Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) - a post-quantum cryp-
tography candidate. It mitigates weaknesses of SIDH such as
Man-in-the-Middle or active reaction attacks [22]. It uses a
335 Byte compressed key. However, as we mitigate the weak-
nesses of SIDH making use of the combination of SIDH
and the STS protocol, we can use even smaller keys! We
can calculate public key sizes for SIDH as follows: During
a key exchange entities Alice and Bob will each transmit two
coefficients defining an elliptic curve and two elliptic curve
points. Each elliptic curve coefficient requires log2 p
2 and each
elliptic curve point can be transmitted in log2 p
2 + 1 Bit. To
obtain a 128 Bit security level a 768 Bit modulus is required,
hence the transmission is 4 × log2(2768)2 + 4 = 6148 Bit
[23]. However, there are key compression techniques for SIDH
public keys resulting in 385 Byte [23] and 328 Byte (2624 Bit)
for Alice’ public key and 330 Byte (2640 Bit) for Bob’s public
key [24]. Thus, for this paper we will assume SIDH public key
sizes to be 2624 and 2640 Bit respectively.
B. Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol
The origin of LDACS mutual authentication and key ex-
change protocol, first mentioned in [6], is a variation of the
STS protocol [13]. Since the publication of [6], we inves-
tigated different STS variants and protocol 5.25 ”Modified
STS protocol” in [13] proves to be more secure and concise
than that mentioned in [6]. It prevents the possibility of a
Man-in-the-Middle attack during the exchange of the key
material by signing the respective material with the help of
exchanged or prestored public key certificates of the respective
communication partner. Details about the use of the authen-
ticated key exchange, STS protocol for LDACS, are listed
in section III-C. However, in order to ensure trust in public
keys from the respective communication partner, a PKI is
required [6]. For a root of trust a PKI is widely considered
as a good solution for the origin of trust as justified in [25],
but comes with some drawbacks for digital aeronautical com-
munications:
1) Massive rollout, management, and revocation of certifi-
cates are required.
2) A root of trust has to be declared and accepted by
state actors worldwide potentially requiring secure cross
certification among all countries worldwide respecting
political situations and regulations in aviation.
With the two drawbacks mentioned PKI may be a challeng-
ing solution for an aeronautical trust framework. But keeping
in mind that digital data links for civil aeronautical traffic (i.e.
AeroMACS) use a PKI as their trust solution [26], it looks
promising to use PKI also for LDACS. Thus, the modified STS
protocol becomes a good candidate for mutual authentication
and key agreement for LDACS.
III. METHOD
Building on the knowledge gained in Section II, this section
concentrates on the applied method for our approach presented
in this paper. Here we introduce the math enabling us to
estimate authentication and key agreement times for LDACS
communicating parties, as well as introducing the STS pro-
tocol for LDACS together with its respective messages and
message sizes.
A. Details of LDACS Framing
The LDACS protocol is structured in time with a frame
structure of slots. In the Forward Link (FL) direction, each
Super Frame (SF) starts with a Broadcast (BC) slot, where
the GS announces their existence to the AS and send physical
parameters for link establishment. The rest of the FL SF is split
into four Multi Frame (MF), each containing nine Orthogo-
nal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (OFDM) frames with a
frame duration of TDF/CC = 6.48ms (54 OFDM symbols).
Each frame has a capacity for 2442 symbols and comprises
three FL Physical layer Service Data Unit (PHY-SDU). Every
FL PHY-SDU can be used to transmit FL user data or Common
Control (CC) data, where GS can allocate resources to an AS.
On the Reverse Link (RL), a SF starts with a Random Access
(RA) slot, where AS can request access to an LDACS cell and
continues with four MF. Each RL MF is constructed from
162 RL PHY-SDU equivalent to OFDM Access (OFDMA)
tiles. They are used to transmit Dedicated Control (DC) data,
where AS can request the allocation for resources allowing
them to send on the RL, and RL user data. Those details are
depicted in Figure 2 [8].
Data is transported in the Data Channel (DCH) via dif-
ferent FL PHY-SDUs and RL PHY-SDUs of different sizes.
Depending on coding and modulation, thus the channel quality,
the FL PHY-SDUs sizes range from 728 to 3296 Bit, and
the RL PHY-SDUs range from 112 to 528 Bit. With 27
frames per MF in total and one to eight FL PHY-SDUs being
reserved on the FL for the Common Control messages, this
leaves 19 to 26 FL PHY-SDUs per MF for data transport.
The minimum amount of Bit per MF can thus be calculated
with 19 ∗ 728 = 13, 832 Bit and the maximum Bit per MF
with 26 ∗ 3296 = 85, 696 Bit. On the reverse link, the RL
PHY-SDUs are separated into 162 tiles. The first two tiles
are sync tiles, followed by a minimum of two DC and a
maximum of 32 DC tiles, which limits the minimum usable
Fig. 2. LDACS frame structure within the Forward and Reverse Link.
user data per MF to (162 − 2 − 32) ∗ 112 = 14, 336 Bit and
allows a maximum of (162 − 2 − 2) ∗ 528 = 83, 424 Bit
per MF [8].
This is equivalent to a minimum data rate of 230.5 kbit/s
on the FL and 238.9 kbit/s on the RL, with maximum control
channel use. Respectively, the maximum data rate is 1428.3
kbit/s on the FL and 1390 kbit/s on the RL, with minimum
control channel use.
B. Model to Emulate Latencies for LDACS
In 2015, Gra¨upl et al. [27] presented a full methodology
on how to emulate latencies for user data in the forward and
reverse link of LDACS depending on the Bit Error Rate (BER)
and message size. The required equations to calculate FL/RL
latencies for LDACS are briefly described in the following and
for more details of LDACS framing, we refer to [8]. Taking
retransmissions into account the FL latency can be calculated
with
LFL(t) = mFL(t) + (1 + δRX(1 + n))× dMF (1)
and the RL latency with
LRL(t) = mRL(t) + (2 + δRX(N + 3))× dMF . (2)
In Equation 1, we use mFL(t) to classify the time until
the start of the next CC frame, δRX ∈ {0, 1} to indicate a
retransmission, dMF denotes the length of a MF and n is
derived from the length of the reverse link medium access
cycle from forward link perspective. In Equation 2, we use
mRL(t) to denote the time until the start of next DC slot,
δRX ∈ {0, 1} to indicate a retransmission, dMF denotes the
length of a MF and N is derived from the length of the reverse
link medium access cycle from reverse link perspective.
We model δRX ∈ {0, 1} as stochastic process, based on the
packet error rate. Given a Bit Error Rate (BER), we can
calculate the packet error rate based on the length of a packet
l: P ({no error in packet}) = (1−BER)l. Thus the opposite
event, that a packet indeed contains an error is: P ({error in
packet}) = 1 − ((1 − BER)l). These two probability decide
the value of δRX , whether a retransmission is necessary and,
thus, an error appeared in the packet, or not. We are aware of
the occurrence of multiple retransmissions, but neglect them at
this stage as we assume that they become exponentially more
unlikely.
Due to the rapid development of LDACS in the last years,
the calculations for n and N changed, due to a reduction of
a previous maximum of 52 slot per MF to now 32 AS per
DC slot per MF [8]: If we assume that LDACS is configured
to use a maximum size DC slot, n = b(i + #AS)/32c and
N = (b(i + #AS)/32c − 3) mod b#AS/32c, with #AS
being the amount of AS per LDACS cell and i indicating the
AS’ position within the DC slot. i may be any value between
1 and the size of the DC slot. If #AS is not equal to the slot
size, the position of an AS in the DC slot will be shifted
by this difference each medium access cycle. On average
we get therefore n = #AS/32 and N = (#AS/32 − 3)
mod #AS/32 over time. mFL(t) denotes the time when a CC
slot is free for an aircraft to obtain resources to send data. It is
dependant on time and we can model it as a stochastic process
returning values between 1 to 60ms with uniform distributions:
1) X = amount of milliseconds an AS has to wait until
it can send on the CC slot with uniform distribution
U(1, 60), with 1 being the lowest waiting values 1 ms
and 60 being the largest waiting value 60 ms.
2) mRL(t) denotes the time when a DC slot is free for an
aircraft to request resources to send data. It is dependant
TABLE I
PARAMETER VALUES FOR LATENCY TIMING FOR THE LDACS MEDIUM ACCESS CONTROL (MAC) PROTOCOL.
Forward Link Model Reverse Link Model
LFL(t) = mFL(t)+ LRL(t) = mRL(t)+
(1 + δRX(1 + n))× dMF (2 + δRX(N + 3))× dMF
Parameters Values Parameters Values
dMF 60ms dMF 60ms
mFL(t) Time until start mRL(t) Average time until start
of next FL MF: of next MAC cycle:
Every 1 to 60ms #AS/32× dMF + wait
modelled by U(1, 60) wait modelled by U(1, 60)
n Average amount of N Average amount of MF
MF after transmission after transmission
until next DC slot is until next DC slot
scheduled for AS scheduled for AS
in MAC-cycle: in MAC-cycle:
n = #AS/32 N = (#AS/32− 3)
mod #AS/32
BER 0, 10−6, 10−5
P P ({no error in packet}) = (1−BER)l
P ({error in packet}) = 1− ((1−BER)l)
on time and the amount of aircraft in an LDACS cell.
Thus we can model it with bi+#AS/32c×dMF+wait,
with wait being a stochastic process returning values
between 1 to 60ms with uniform distribution and i
uniformly distributed between 1 and the slot size over
time.
We list in Table I all necessary parameters, we need to
obtain latency values for the different authentication and key
agreement protocols for LDACS.
C. LDACS Certificate Based Authentication Protocol
In Section II-B we already introduced the concept to make
use of the STS protocol for LDACS, as already suggested in
[6] and [7]. First we want to introduce the exact protocol run
foreseen to be used for LDACS and then define message sizes
for our emulation of latency times. Please note that steps 2,
3 and 4 in the depicted protocol variant in Figure 3 follow
closely protocol 5.25 in [13], which has been proven secure
in the Bellare et al. model [28].
Protocol Run: Figure 3 assumes GS and GSC to have
already established a secure connection and the GS can now
start sending broadcast beacons announcing its existence.
Furthermore several parameter need to have been exchanged
prior to the protocol run: (1) depending on the choice of the
DHKE, necessary public parameters have to be pre-deployed
(e.g. p, g), (2) certificates and the public keys of the respective
other communication partner have to be at AS and GSC, (3)
a selection and agreement of signature and encryption has
to have happened at AS and GSC. The cell entry follows
details specified in the official LDACS specification [8]: The
System Identification Broadcast (SIB) serves as identifier,
containing physical parameters and the IDGSC for AS to
begin establishing a connection to that GS and ultimately
GSC. After this step, authentication messages are only sent
in the DCH. As for cryptographic material SigAS(DATA)
and SigGSC(DATA) denote the signature of DATA of the
respective entities. For the DHKE variations, we use x, y as
secrets of GSC and AS, tAS , tGSC denote the public key of
AS and GSC, MSAS−GSC is the final Master Secret (MS)
between AS and GSC derived with HKDF(PMSAS−GSC).
HKDF denotes the Hash-based Key Derivation Function [29]
and PMSAS−GSC is the Pre-Master Secret (PMS) of AS and
GSC. At every verification step, the protocol in Figure 3
assumes the verification to be successful and thus continues.
If verification fails, the connection is terminated and the
authentication process retried with another suitable GS in
range.
Message Data Formats: The details about all message
formats and lengths is summarized in Table II. We define data
TABLE II
MESSAGE FORMATS FOR THE THREE LDACS AUTHENTICATION
MESSAGES, WITH LENGTHS OF RESPECTIVE FIELDS IN Bit.
Message Header Field 1 Field 2
ServerHello header: 48 tGSC -
KeyExchange
ClientHello header: 48 tAS SigAS : 512
KeyExchange
ServerKey header: 48 SigGSC : 512 -
ExchangeF inished
sizes for the authentication and key agreement messages here
for the STS for LDACS protocol. For signatures lengths, we
assume a total length of 64 Byte for a message signature,
produced by current signature procedures such as EdDSA-
Ed25519 [30] or even post-quantum procedures such as rain-
bow [31].
All messages have a header consisting of TY PE, ID,
UA and PRIO fields. TY PE is a 4 Bit long field and
clarifies the message type, ID is 12 Bit long and denotes
the ID of that message, UA is the 28 Bit long Unique
Address field, containing the LDACS specific addresses of
AS and GS and finally the 4 Bit long PRIO field signifies
the priority this particular message has. We collect all these
Ground Station Controller (GSC) Ground Station (GS) Aircraft Station (AS)
1 :
SystemIdentificationBroadcast in BCCH
|SIB|IDGSC |
Store claimed IDGSC of GSC
CellEntryRequest in RACH
|CELL RQST |IDAS |
Store claimed IDAS of AS
ASIDInfo
|IDAS |
CellEntryResponse in CCCH
|CELL RESP |
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DCH open for authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Start STS
Choose secret x
Calculate tGSC = gx mod p
2 :
ServerHelloKeyExchange
|tGSC |
Forward
ServerHelloKeyExchange
Choose secret y
Calculate tAS = gy mod p
Calculate PMSAS−GSC with y and tGSC = gx
PMSAS−GSC = (gx)y mod p
Generate MSAS−GSC = HKDF (PMSAS−GSC)
Build SigAS(tAS , tGSC , IDAS , IDGSC)
3 :
Forward
ClientHelloKeyExchange
ClientHelloKeyExchange
|tAS |SigAS(tAS , tGSC , IDAS , IDGSC)|
Verify SigAS(tAS , tGSC , IDAS , IDGSC)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AS authenticated to GSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
If correct: Finish STS
Calculate PMSAS−GSC with x and tAS = gy
PMSAS−GSC = (gy)x mod p
Generate MSAS−GSC = HKDF (PMSAS−GSC)
Build SigGSC(tGSC , tAS , IDGSC , IDAS)
4 :
ServerKeyExchangeFinished
|SigGSC(tGSC , tAS , IDGSC , IDAS)|
Forward
ServerKeyExchangeFinished
Verify SigGSC(tGSC , tAS , IDGSC , IDAS)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GSC authenticated to AS → AS and GSC mutually authenticated and sharing a master secret MSAS−GSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 3. LDACS Station-To-Station Authentication Protocol
fields into the header resulting in a 48 Bit length. tGSC and
tAS are the public keys of the respective entities and have
different sizes, depending on the choice of the Diffie-Hellman
procedure. The sizes for the public key of the GSC tGSC
are: {DHKE = 3072|ECDH = 256|SIDH = 2624}. The
sizes for the public key of the AS tAS are: {DHKE =
3072|ECDH = 256|SIDH = 2640}.
The ServerHelloKeyExchange message, responsible to
initiate the STS protocol between AS and GSC consists
of the header and the public key of the GSC tGSC .
Depending on the size of the public keys, the sizes
forServerHelloKeyExchange are {3120, 304, 2672} Bit.
The key exchange message AS to GSC is denoted as
ClientKeyExchangeF inished and consists of the header,
the public key of the AS tAS and an AS signature SigAS .
Depending on the size of the public keys, the sizes for
ClientKeyExchangeF inished are {3632, 816, 3200} Bit.
Finally the ServerKeyExchangeF inished finishes the STS
protocol and consists of the header and a GSC signature
SigGSC , totalling in 560 Bit.
IV. EVALUATION
We start by listing all assumptions for our evaluation and
then proceed by evaluating authentication data overhead and
latency. Then we give the overall formula including ground
communication and computation delays to calculate the over-
all authentication latency. Finally we look at the maximum
amount of authentication attempts per MF, in dependence to
FL/RL PHY-SDU sizes, thus coding and modulation rates of
LDACS.
A. Assumptions
For the results of the simulations presented in this sec-
tion we have the following assumptions: Concerning LDACS
(1) all public DHKE parameters have been distributed to
AS and GSC previously and (2) GS and GSC have estab-
lished a secure connection. For the STS results we assume
(3) certificates and the public key of the respective other com-
munication partner were handed out in previous steps. Further,
we assume (4) processing times at the respective entities to
be negligible for the LDACS latency, but denote them with
4Comp(ENTITY ), with ENTITY ∈ {AS,GS,GSC}.
Communication times between GS and GSC for STS are
denoted with 4Comm(GSC). Also we (5) only measure
the authentication time after cell entry procedure has been
completed (starting from step 2 in Figure 3). Finally (6) due
to fibre glass optical cables and fast network ground routing
we assume these latency times to be negligible compared to
LDACS latency times.
B. Authentication Data Overhead
In Section III-C we already explained the sizes of each mes-
sage. Without retransmissions we calculate the total amount
of data exchanged for each protocol and key exchange flavor,
resulting in the values listed in Table III.
TABLE III
TOTAL AUTHENTICATION MESSAGE SIZES IN Bit
STS-DHKE STS-ECDH STS-SIDH
7312 1680 6432
Following the paradigm ”the lower the BER, the lower the
amount of retransmissions and vice versa”, overall authentica-
tion data can increase with increasing retransmissions. Based
on the total authentication data calculated, we observed dif-
ferent authentication latency times for LDACS and impact of
BER on the suitability of the different protocols and key
exchange flavors.
C. Authentication Latency
We investigated an authentication latency baseline by setting
the BER=0 and then looked at the more realistic points of
operation of LDACS with BER=10−5 and BER=10−6.
Authentication Latency Baseline: With BER = 0, the
different sizes of the DHKE variations have no impact on the
latency times, only the amount of exchanged authentication
messages. Assuming only one authenticating AS per multi-
frame (c.f. Section IV-D), each authentication message fits into
the FL PHY-SDUs and RL PHY-SDUs of one multiframe.
Fig. 4. Baseline authentication latency of STS depending of the amount
of AS in an LDACS cell at BER= 0.
Thus we can calculate the latency times for STS at BER =
0 and depending of the existing amount of AS per LDACS
cell. Results are depicted in Figure 4. We see, that total
authentication latencies start at a minimum of 245 ms, average
at 332 ms and have a maximum of 422 ms for one aircraft
in an LDACS cell. Then latency increase linearly on average,
ending at a minimum of 1203 ms, average at 1290 ms and
reach a maximum at 1380 ms for 512 aircraft in an LDACS
cell. Differences between mean and 95%-percentile latencies
of around 60 ms stem from the differences of average and
maximum waiting time for an AS, until either a CC or DC
slot is free to request or receive resource allocations.
LDACS Point of Operation Authentication Latency:
To receive representative results, we assume only one authen-
ticating AS per MF and we emulate 10,000 authentication
attempts at BER=10−5 and BER=10−6 in dependence on the
amount of AS in an LDACS cell. We chose this amount of
authentication attempts as the probability of a retransmission
is calculated as 1 − (1 − BER)l with l being the packet
length, following Section III-B. The smallest message for the
STS protocol in the FL is 560 Bit and 624 Bit in the RL.
This results in a retransmission probability at BER=10−6 of
0,0560% in the FL and 0,0624% in the RL. Thus emulating
10,000 authentication attempts suffices to trigger at least one
retransmission of the smallest authentication message and is
sufficiently accurate for the authentication latency emulation.
We perform this emulation with each key exchange flavor
respectively.
Overall comparing Figures 5 and 4 with each other, we
clearly see, that retransmissions and thus the choice of DHKE
flavor does not play a large role at this BER for the authentica-
tion latency. All authentication latency graphs start at around
320 ms on average and 400 ms for 95%-precentile for one
Fig. 5. Authentication latency of the STS protocol depending of the
amount of AS in an LDACS cell and DHKE at BER=10−6.
AS in a cell and end at 1300 ms on average and 1340 ms for
95%-precentile for more than 500 AS in a cell. At BER of
10−5, depicted in Figure 6, we notice that the different public
key sizes of the different DHKE variations have a major effect
on the overall authentication time.
Fig. 6. Authentication latency of the STS protocol depending of the amount
of AS in an LDACS cell and DHKE at BER=10−5. Note that the
small peaks in the result for less than 3× 32 AS are caused by the
DC slot falling into an unfavorable position for retransmissions as
calculated by N in Table I.
While all DHKE variations start at 300-400 ms on average
for one AS and end at 1300 ms on average for more than 500
AS in a cell, the 95% percentiles differ greatly. While 95%
percentiles of ECDH follow a similar trajectory to its averages
due to its small key sizes, the 95% percentile of DHKE and
SIDH look vastly different. DHKE and SIDH start at around
400 ms for one AS in the cell, have a small peak at 750
ms, at 96 AS in a cell due to the DC slot falling into an
unfavourable position (c.f. Figure 6) and end at 2220 ms for
more than 500 AS per cell. At 500 AS in an LDACS cell, we
see a time difference of almost 1200 ms for the authentication
to complete between the SIDH/DHKE and ECDH approach,
with ECDH being the much faster candidate.
Summary of LDACS Authentication Latency Find-
ings: The requirements document DO-350A imposes a
RCTPCSP = 10s threshold for RCP 130/A1 message types
[32], meaning that all authentication and connection estab-
lishment must be completed below the 10s threshold [8].
Authentication times in all scenarios considered in this paper
remain always under the required threshold. This is in itself
an important finding of this work.
Overall metrics for LDACS Authentication Latency:
In the previous paragraphs, we only looked at the total
authentication times induced by the radio gap and the LDACS
protocol between AS and GS. To complete this picture, we
want to include all additional, albeit simplified, computation
(Comp) and communication (Comm) latencies mentioned at
the beginning of Section IV. Hence, for the overall LDACS
STS authentication and key agreement time between AS and
GSC, denoted LSTS , we can use formula (3) based on syntax
introduced in Section III-B).
LSTS = 4Comp(GSC) +4Comm(GSC) + LFL(t)+
4Comp(AS) + LRL(t) +4Comm(GSC)+
4Comp(GSC) +4Comm(GSC) + LFL(t)+
4Comp(AS)
= 2× LFL(t) + 1× LRL(t)+
2×4Comp(AS)+
2×4Comp(GSC) + 3×4Comm(GSC)
(3)
Assuming the communication latency induced by LDACS
on the FL and RL is much larger than any of the computational
delays (true for DHKE [33], ECDH [33], SIDH [22]) and
ground based communication delays, the calculation of LSTS
can be simplified to:
LSTS = 2× LFL(t) + 1× LRL(t) + constant (4)
So far, we only regarded one authenticating aircraft. In the
following, we want to look at the possible amount of simulta-
neously authenticating aircraft per multiframe, depending on
the authentication method.
D. Coding and Modulation Impact on Authentication Protocol
In Section III-A we calculated the minimum data size in the
FL per MF to be 13, 832 Bit and in the RL to be 14, 336 Bit per
MF assuming the most conservative coding and modulation,
and maximum size control channels. Depending on the DHKE
procedure, the sizes of authentication messages for STS range
from 304, 560, 2672, to 3120 Bit in the FL and from 816,
3200 to 3632 Bit in the RL according to Section III-C. We
can calculate the maximum number of authentication attempts
per multiframe with the message sizes and minimum data sizes
per multiframe (detailed in Section III-A) given, depending on
the choice of DHKE procedure. Please note, that here we also
assume a maximum usage of FL/RL PHY-SDU with control
channel data, same as listed in Section III-A. We list the results
in Table IV.
TABLE IV
MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF AUTHENTICATION ATTEMPTS PER MULTIFRAME
FOR LOWEST CODING AND MODULATION RATE OF LDACS AND MAXIMAL
CONTROL SLOT OCCUPANCY, DEPENDING ON THE CHOICE OF KEY
EXCHANGE PROTOCOL.
DHKE STS
Procedure FL RL
#Auth. Size of #Auth. Size of
Attempts message Attempts message
DHKE 4 3120 Bit 3 3696 Bit
ECDH 45 304 Bit 17 816 Bit
SIDH 5 2672 Bit 4 3200 Bit
With increasingly better coding and modulation the sizes for
FL PHY-SDU frames and RL PHY-SDU tiles increase and
thus the possible amount of authentication attempts per MF
increases. In Figure 7 we show results of possible amounts
of authentication attempts for the STS protocol in dependence
of our three key agreement flavors, FL/RL PHY-SDU sizes
and assume minimal control slot occupancy (FL: one CC slot,
RL: two DC slots). Each group depicted in Figure 7 represents
one set of FL/RL PHY-SDU sizes, so for the first three bars
in Figure 7 we have 112 Bit RL PHY-SDU tiles and 728
Bit FL PHY-SDU frames. Overall we have {728, 960, 1080,
Fig. 7. Maximum possible amount of authentication attempts per MF
in dependence on RL PHY-SDU tiles/FL PHY-SDU frames.
1456, 1936, 2176, 2928, 3296} Bit per FL PHY-SDU frame
and {112, 152, 176, 224, 312, 360, 480, 528} Bit per RL
PHY-SDU tile. Figure 7 shows especially the ECDH variation
to be efficient, due to the small public key sizes. We also
see that DHKE or SIDH only marginally differ in amount
of possible AS per MF. Overall the biggest difference of the
ECDH and DHKE/SIDH, is the maximum possible amount of
authentication tries of AS per MF. The STS protocol allows
for a maximum of 27 DHKE, 32 SIDH or 281 ECDH based
messages in the FL and 22 DHKE, 26 SIDH or 153 ECDH
based messages in the RL. This concludes in an important
finding of this work, to introduce a maximum amount of AS
authentication attempts. Otherwise it is possible for an AS
to continuously send authentication requests and thus block
communication for other aircraft.
V. SUMMARY
The objective of this paper was to compare the suitability of
three different variations of the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
within the STS protocol for LDACS. We introduced the basic
math behind the Diffie-Hellman key exchange and explained
the variations ECDH and SIDH. Then we explained the choice
of parameters and public, private key sizes used in this paper.
With introduced formulas to calculate communication latency
times for LDACS and an in-depth look at the STS variation
for LDACS, we could calculate the overall authentication data
sizes for each protocol and key exchange flavor. Comparing
the sizes of all three key agreement variations, we see that
DHKE > SIDH >> ECDH . This is highlighted further
when looking at the maximum authentication attempts of an
aircraft per LDACS multiframe, depending on the amount of
AS already in an LDACS cell and LDACS signal quality.
Overall STS-ECDH proved to be the most efficient variation
for the most AS authentication attempts per multiframe. One
important finding of this paper is to introduce a maximum
authentication attempt threshold for authenticating AS, as oth-
erwise an aircraft can block LDACS resources by continuously
trying and failing to authenticate.
For a successful implementation of MAKE protocols for
LDACS we recommend the key exchange flavors ECDH and
SIDH, due to the short key sizes in ECDH and the post-
quantum robustness of SIDH. If a central trust approach,
such as a PKI, is favoured for the final trust solution for
LDACS, we can fully recommend the mentioned STS variant
in Figure 3. For future research, an implementation of the STS
protocol with ECDH and SIDH key flavors within a software
simulation is foreseen, which can further our understanding
of the strengths and weaknesses of the protocol and key
exchange variations. This also allows us to gather accurate
communication and computation times, some of which were
simplified in this work.
Overall with a suitable protocol candidate and key agreement
variation under investigation, the future cybersecurity archi-
tecture of LDACS has a cornerstone for laying the foundation
of trust.
APPENDIX
AeroMACS Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communication
System
AOC Aeronautical Operational Control
AS Aircraft Station
ATM Air Traffic Management
ATS Air Traffic Services
BC Broadcast
BER Bit Error Rate
CC Common Control
CNS Communication, Navigation and Surveillance
DC Dedicated Control
DCH Data Channel
DHKE Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
FL Forward Link
GCM Galois Counter Mode
GS Ground Station
GSC Ground Station Controller
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
LDACS L-band Digital Aeronautical Communication
System
MAC Medium Access Control
MAKE Mutual Authentication and Key Exchange
MF Multi Frame
MS Master Secret
OFDM Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing
PHY-SDU Physical layer Service Data Unit
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PMS Pre-Master Secret
RA Random Access
RL Reverse Link
SF Super Frame
SIB System Identification Broadcast
SIDH Supersingular Isogeny Diffie–Hellman
SIKE Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation
STS Station-To-Station
VDL VHF Data Link
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